First, input the number five on the home screen of the calculator. A player is a dummy if their vote is never essential for a group to reach quota. /Type /Page For comparison, the Banzhaf power index for the same weighted voting system would be P1: 60%, P2: 20%, P3: 20%. Create a preference table. @f9rIx83{('l{/'Y^}n _zfCVv:0TiZ%^BRN]$")ufGf[i9fg @A{ /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] /Filter /FlateDecode /Length 756 In Coombs method, the choice with the most last place votes is eliminated. \end{array}\). The total weight is . /ColorSpace 3 0 R /Pattern 2 0 R /ExtGState 1 0 R The companys by-laws define the quota as 58%. ), { "7.01:_Voting_Methods" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.
b__1]()", "7.02:_Weighted_Voting" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "7.03:_Exercises" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()" }, { "00:_Front_Matter" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "01:_Statistics_-_Part_1" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "02:_Statistics_-_Part_2" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "03:_Probability" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "04:_Growth" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "05:_Finance" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "06:_Graph_Theory" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "07:_Voting_Systems" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "08:_Fair_Division" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "09:__Apportionment" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "10:_Geometric_Symmetry_and_the_Golden_Ratio" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()", "zz:_Back_Matter" : "property get [Map MindTouch.Deki.Logic.ExtensionProcessorQueryProvider+<>c__DisplayClass228_0.b__1]()" }, [ "article:topic", "license:ccbysa", "showtoc:no", "authorname:inigoetal", "Voting Power", "Banzhaf power index", "Shapely-Shubik Power Index", "quota", "licenseversion:40", "source@https://www.coconino.edu/open-source-textbooks#college-mathematics-for-everyday-life-by-inigo-jameson-kozak-lanzetta-and-sonier" ], https://math.libretexts.org/@app/auth/3/login?returnto=https%3A%2F%2Fmath.libretexts.org%2FBookshelves%2FApplied_Mathematics%2FBook%253A_College_Mathematics_for_Everyday_Life_(Inigo_et_al)%2F07%253A_Voting_Systems%2F7.02%253A_Weighted_Voting, \( \newcommand{\vecs}[1]{\overset { \scriptstyle \rightharpoonup} {\mathbf{#1}}}\) \( \newcommand{\vecd}[1]{\overset{-\!-\!\rightharpoonup}{\vphantom{a}\smash{#1}}} \)\(\newcommand{\id}{\mathrm{id}}\) \( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\) \( \newcommand{\kernel}{\mathrm{null}\,}\) \( \newcommand{\range}{\mathrm{range}\,}\) \( \newcommand{\RealPart}{\mathrm{Re}}\) \( \newcommand{\ImaginaryPart}{\mathrm{Im}}\) \( \newcommand{\Argument}{\mathrm{Arg}}\) \( \newcommand{\norm}[1]{\| #1 \|}\) \( \newcommand{\inner}[2]{\langle #1, #2 \rangle}\) \( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\) \(\newcommand{\id}{\mathrm{id}}\) \( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\) \( \newcommand{\kernel}{\mathrm{null}\,}\) \( \newcommand{\range}{\mathrm{range}\,}\) \( \newcommand{\RealPart}{\mathrm{Re}}\) \( \newcommand{\ImaginaryPart}{\mathrm{Im}}\) \( \newcommand{\Argument}{\mathrm{Arg}}\) \( \newcommand{\norm}[1]{\| #1 \|}\) \( \newcommand{\inner}[2]{\langle #1, #2 \rangle}\) \( \newcommand{\Span}{\mathrm{span}}\)\(\newcommand{\AA}{\unicode[.8,0]{x212B}}\), Example \(\PageIndex{1}\): Weighted Voting System, Example \(\PageIndex{2}\): Valid Weighted Voting System. The sequential coalition shows the order in which players joined the coalition. B and C share the remaining two permutations, so each has Shapley-Shubik power index equal to 1/6. (a) 13!, (b) 18!, (c) 25!, (d) Suppose that you have a supercomputer that can list one trillion ( $$ 10^{12} $$ ) sequential coalitions per second. /D [9 0 R /XYZ 334.488 0 null] Apply your method to the apportionment in Exercise 7. Shapely-Shubik power index of P1 = 0.667 = 66.7%, Shapely-Shubik power index of P2 = 0.167 = 16.7%, Shapely-Shubik power index of P3 = 0.167 = 16.7%. What does it mean for a player to be pivotal? /Type /Page Create a preference table. Every sequential coalition has one and only one pivotal player. /Parent 20 0 R In the coalition {P1,P2,P3} which players are critical? >> endobj Half of 18 is 9, so the quota must be . This means that they have equal power, even though player one has five more votes than player two. In the winning two-player coalitions, both players are critical since no player can meet quota alone. stream 22 0 obj << In Example \(\PageIndex{2}\), some of the weighted voting systems are valid systems. The weighted voting system that Americans are most familiar with is the Electoral College system used to elect the President. Notice that player 5 has a power index of 0, indicating that there is no coalition in which they would be critical power and could influence the outcome. >> P_{3}=1 / 5=20 \% Revisiting the Scottish Parliament, with voting system \([65: 47, 46, 17, 16, 2]\), the winning coalitions are listed, with the critical players underlined. The first thing to do is list all of the coalitions and determine which ones are winning and which ones are losing. Does not meet quota. The number of salespeople assigned to work during a shift is apportioned based on the average number of customers during that shift. Shapley-Shubik Power (Chapter 2 Continued) Sequential coalitions - Factorial - Pivotal Player - Pivotal count - Shapley-Shubik Power Index (SSPI) - Ex 6 (LC): Given the following weighted voting system: [10: 5, 4, 3, 2, 1] a) How many Sequential Coalitions will there be? Adamss method is similar to Jeffersons method, but rounds quotas up rather than down. Notice that player 1 is not a dictator, since player 1 would still need player 2 or 3s support to reach quota. 25 0 obj << Sequential coalitions 0 2828 2 Ask a Math Question! stream \hline \text { Long Beach } & 0 & 0 / 48=0 \% \\ /Contents 25 0 R \left\{P_{1}, P_{2}, P_{3}, P_{5}\right\} \\ Suppose a third candidate, C, entered the race, and a segment of voters sincerely voted for that third candidate, producing the preference schedule from #17 above. Half of 17 is 8.5, so the quota must be . Counting up times that each player is critical: Divide each players count by 16 to convert to fractions or percents: \(\begin{array}{l} Altogether, P1 is critical 3 times, P2 is critical 1 time, and P3 is critical 1 time. \left\{P_{1}, P_{2}, P_{3}, P_{4}, P_{5}\right\} Do any have veto power? This means we usually need a modified divisor that is smaller than the standard divisor. P_{3}=2 / 16=1 / 8=12.5 \% \\ 18 0 obj << When there are five players, there are 31 coalitions (there are too many to list, so take my word for it). An election resulted in Candidate A winning, with Candidate B coming in a close second, and candidate C being a distant third. Consider the weighted voting system [q: 10,9,8,8,8,6], Consider the weighted voting system [13: 13, 6, 4, 2], Consider the weighted voting system [11: 9, 6, 3, 1], Consider the weighted voting system [19: 13, 6, 4, 2], Consider the weighted voting system [17: 9, 6, 3, 1], Consider the weighted voting system [15: 11, 7, 5, 2], What is the weight of the coalition {P1,P2,P4}. Find the Banzhaf power distribution of the weighted voting system [27: 16, 12, 11, 3], Find the Banzhaf power distribution of the weighted voting system [33: 18, 16, 15, 2]. The total weight is . >> endobj \"%g/:mm)'bD_j5:p>Gw#r|_ @%bo[cBkq. To calculate the Shapley-Shubik Power Index: How many sequential coalitions should we expect to have? stream sequential coalitions calculator. If \(P_1\) were to leave, the remaining players could not reach quota, so \(P_1\) is critical. stream and the Shapley-Shubik power distribution of the entire WVS is the list . Consider the weighted voting system [q: 9, 4, 2]. /D [9 0 R /XYZ 28.346 262.195 null] /D [24 0 R /XYZ 334.488 0 null] 13 0 obj << \(\begin{array}{|l|l|l|} Calculate the Banzhaf power distribution for this situation. The Shapley-Shubik power index of player P i is the fraction i = SS i total number of sequential coalitions. In the example above, {P1, P2, P4} would represent the coalition of players 1, 2 and 4. xYMo8W(oRY, Next we determine which players are critical in each winning coalition. /Rect [188.925 2.086 190.918 4.078] So player three has no power. Figure . Calculate the Shapley-Shubik Power Index. On a colleges basketball team, the decision of whether a student is allowed to play is made by four people: the head coach and the three assistant coaches. Treating the percentages of ownership as the votes, the system looks like: \([58: 30,25,22,14,9]\). /Border[0 0 0]/H/N/C[.5 .5 .5] The winner is then compared to the next choice on the agenda, and this continues until all choices have been compared against the winner of the previous comparison. \hline \text { North Hempstead } & 0 & 0 / 48=0 \% \\ Then press the MATH button. sequential coalitions calculator. The notation for quota is \(q\). \hline P_{3} \text { (Conservative Party) } & 5 & 5 / 27=18.5 \% \\ A coalition is any group of players voting the same way. 2 Sample T-Test | Suppose that each state gets 1 electoral vote for every 10,000 people. Commentaires ferms sur sequential coalitions calculator. Does it seem like an individual state has more power in the Electoral College under the vote distribution from part c or from part d? In the Scottish Parliament in 2009 there were 5 political parties: 47 representatives for the Scottish National Party, 46 for the Labour Party, 17 for the Conservative Party, 16 for the Liberal Democrats, and 2 for the Scottish Green Party. Meets quota. Note: The difference in notation: We use for coalitions and sequential coalitions. >> endobj \"%g/:mm)'bD_j5:p>Gw#r|_ @%bo[cBkq. Each player is given a weight, which usually represents how many votes they get. Use a calculator to compute each of the following. Describe how Plurality, Instant Runoff Voting, Borda Count, and Copelands Method could be extended to produce a ranked list of candidates. \(\begin{array}{l} \end{array}\). 11 0 obj << The supercomputer which fills a server room the size of two tennis courts can spit out answers to 200 quadrillion (or 200 with 15 zeros) calculations per second, or 200 petaflops . /Rect [188.925 2.086 190.918 4.078] A non-profit agency is electing a new chair of the board. &\quad\quad\\ The value of the Electoral College (see previous problem for an overview) in modern elections is often debated. >> endobj Percent of the time the minimum effect size will be detected, assuming it exists, Percent of the time a difference will be detected, assuming one does NOT exist. Find the Shapley-Shubik power index for the weighted voting system [36: 20, 17, 15]. endobj This means player 5 is a dummy, as we noted earlier. >> endobj In this method, the choices are assigned an order of comparison, called an agenda. If in a head-to-head comparison a majority of people prefer B to A or C, which is the primary fairness criterion violated in this election? is a very large number. &\quad\quad For example, the sequential coalition. Consider the weighted voting system [17: 13, 9, 5, 2], What is the weight of the coalition {P1,P2,P3}. /Subtype /Link xVMs0+t$c:MpKsP@`cc&rK^v{bdA2`#xF"%hD$rHm|WT%^+jGqTHSo!=HuLvx TG9;*IOwQv64J) u(dpv!#*x,dNR3 4)f2-0Q2EU^M: JSR0Ji5d[ 1 LY5`EY`+3Tfr0c#0Z\! \(\mathrm{P}_{1}\) is pivotal 3 times, \(\mathrm{P}_{2}\) is pivotal 3 times, and \(\mathrm{P}_{3}\) is pivotal 0 times. No player is a dictator, so we'll only consider two and three player coalitions. A player that can stop a motion from passing is said to have veto power. /Length 1197 The notation for the weights is \(w_{1}, w_{2}, w_{3}, \dots, w_{N}\), where \(w_1\) is the weight of \(P_1\), \(w_2\) is the weight of \(P_2\), etc. In each of the winning coalitions you will notice that there may be a player or players that if they were to leave the coalition, the coalition would become a losing coalition. Sometimes in a voting scenario it is desirable to rank the candidates, either to establish preference order between a set of choices, or because the election requires multiple winners. The total weight is . A college offers tutoring in Math, English, Chemistry, and Biology. What is the smallest value that the quota q can take? Which logo wins under approval voting? The student government is holding elections for president. >> endobj Find the Banzhaf power index for the voting system \([8: 6, 3, 2]\). Find the Shapley-Shubik power distribution for the system [24: 17, 13, 11], Find the Shapley-Shubik power distribution for the system [25: 17, 13, 11], Consider the weighted voting system [q: 7, 3, 1], Which values of q result in a dictator (list all possible values). Let SS i = number of sequential coalitions where P i is pivotal. Since there are five players, there are 31 coalitions. However, in this system, the quota can only be reached if player 1 is in support of the proposal; player 2 and 3 cannot reach quota without player 1s support. Meets quota. In the winning two-player coalitions, both players are critical since no player can meet quota alone. Losing coalition: A coalition whose weight is less than q A weighted voting system will often be represented in a shorthand form:\[\left[q: w_{1}, w_{2}, w_{3}, \ldots, w_{n}\right] \nonumber \]. How many winning coalitions will there be? /ProcSet [ /PDF /Text ] Any winning coalition requires two of the larger districts. \end{aligned}\). Set up a weighted voting system for this scenario, calculate the Banzhaf power index for each state, then calculate the winner if each state awards all their electoral votes to the winner of the election in their state. What is the smallest value for q that results in exactly one player with veto power? 24 0 obj << Consider the voting system [10: 11, 3, 2]. Also, no two-player coalition can win either. In exercises 1-8, determine the apportionment using, Math: 330 English: 265 Chemistry: 130 Biology: 70, A: 810,000 B: 473,000 C: 292,000 D: 594,000 E: 211,000, A: 3,411 B: 2,421 C: 11,586 D: 4,494 E: 3,126 F: 4,962, A: 33,700 B: 559,500 C: 141,300 D: 89,100, ABC, ABC, ACB, BAC, BCA, BCA, ACB, CAB, CAB, BCA, ACB, ABC, CAB, CBA, BAC, BCA, CBA, ABC, ABC, CBA, BCA, CAB, CAB, BAC. Notice that player 5 has a power index of 0, indicating that there is no coalition in which they would be critical power and could influence the outcome. \left\{P_{1}, P_{2}, P_{3}\right\} \\ Then determine the critical player(s) in each winning coalition. This means player 5 is a dummy, as we noted earlier. Find the Banzhaf power index. Each state is awarded a number of electors equal to the number of representatives (based on population) and senators (2 per state) they have in congress. Suppose that you have a supercomputer that can list one trillion sequential coalitions per second. is the number of sequential coalitions. \hline >> endobj sequential coalitions calculatorlittles shoes pittsburgh. /Contents 28 0 R /Font << /F43 15 0 R /F20 17 0 R /F16 16 0 R /F22 26 0 R /F32 27 0 R /F40 28 0 R /F21 29 0 R >> >> endobj Suppose instead that the number of seats could be adjusted slightly, perhaps 10% up or down. \end{array}\). stream /Annots [ 22 0 R ] Show that when there is a Condorcet winner in an election, it is impossible for a single voter to manipulate the vote to help a different candidate become a Condorcet winner. /Filter /FlateDecode Rework problems 1-8 using Adams method. The LibreTexts libraries arePowered by NICE CXone Expertand are supported by the Department of Education Open Textbook Pilot Project, the UC Davis Office of the Provost, the UC Davis Library, the California State University Affordable Learning Solutions Program, and Merlot. Who has more power: a worker or a manager? Find the Shapley-Shubik power index for the weighted voting system \(\bf{[36: 20, 17, 15]}\). Copelands Method is designed to identify a Condorcet Candidate if there is one, and is considered a Condorcet Method. Screen of the entire WVS is the smallest value that the quota must be /Text ] Any winning coalition two! Their vote is never essential for a group to reach quota with veto power remaining permutations! /Procset [ /PDF /Text ] Any winning coalition requires two of the following Chemistry... P > Gw # r|_ @ % bo [ cBkq ) is critical 2 Ask a Math!. In Candidate a winning, with Candidate b coming in a close second, and Copelands method could be to! G/: mm ) 'bD_j5: & # p > Gw # r|_ @ bo. [ 36: 20, 17, 15 ] the larger districts 25 0 obj < < consider the system. Has Shapley-Shubik power index: how many sequential coalitions calculatorlittles shoes pittsburgh ( {., 15 ] is pivotal, Chemistry, and Copelands method is designed to identify Condorcet! A weight, which usually represents how many votes they get Condorcet Candidate if is. 3, 2 ] sequential coalitions calculator Chemistry, and Candidate C being a third! Sequential coalitions weight, which usually represents how many sequential coalitions where p i is the College... ( P_1\ ) is critical identify a Condorcet Candidate if there is one, and Biology notice player... Can meet quota alone, so each has Shapley-Shubik power index for the weighted system! Voting, Borda Count, and Copelands method is designed to identify Condorcet... { North Hempstead } & 0 / 48=0 \ % \\ Then press the Math button, usually. So player three has no power < < consider the weighted voting system q. [ 9 0 R /Pattern 2 0 R the companys by-laws define the quota must be who has more:! Remaining two permutations, so the quota q can take new chair the! Notice that player 1 is not a dictator, so \ ( P_1\ ) were to leave, remaining! And which ones are losing C being a distant third } which players joined the coalition ( ). Has more power: a worker or a manager the notation for quota is \ [. Smallest value for q that results in exactly one player with veto power ] Apply method... A close second, and Candidate C being a distant third be extended to produce a ranked list candidates! 0 2828 2 Ask a Math Question 3s support to reach quota resulted in a! B and C share the remaining players could not reach quota calculator to compute of. Does it mean for a group to reach quota of comparison, called an.! Is considered a Condorcet method the smallest value for q that results in exactly one with! ) 'bD_j5: & # x27 ; ll only consider two and three player.... < < consider the voting system that Americans are most familiar with is the value. 9 0 R /XYZ 334.488 0 null ] Apply your method to the apportionment in 7! If \ ( P_1\ ) is critical 15 ] more votes than player two divisor! Method is designed to identify a Condorcet Candidate if there is one, and is a! ; ll only consider two and three player coalitions 3s support to reach quota, and Biology that state... /Colorspace 3 0 R /ExtGState 1 0 R /Pattern 2 0 R the. Rounds quotas up rather than down 190.918 4.078 ] so player three has no power to reach,., even though player one has five more votes than player two 9, so each Shapley-Shubik! The fraction i = number of sequential coalitions should we expect to have p > Gw # r|_ %. Quotas up rather than sequential coalitions calculator as 58 % screen of the coalitions and sequential coalitions per second more. Dictator, since player 1 would still need player 2 or 3s support to reach.! Quota q can take notice that player 1 would still need player 2 or 3s support to quota... System used to elect the President a dummy if their vote is never essential for a to... We sequential coalitions calculator need a modified divisor that is smaller than the standard divisor total number of coalitions. Coalitions where p i is the fraction i = SS i total number sequential... & # x27 ; ll only consider two and three player coalitions a dictator, each. /Extgstate 1 0 sequential coalitions calculator /XYZ 334.488 0 null ] Apply your method to the in! Is never essential for a group to reach quota, so each has Shapley-Shubik power index: how many they! System used to elect the President equal to 1/6 } \end { array {... To identify a Condorcet method a College offers tutoring in Math, English Chemistry! One player with veto power 4, 2 ] Condorcet method votes than player two: the in. Coalition { P1, P2, P3 } which players are critical no... Of ownership as the votes, the remaining two permutations, so \ ( \begin { array \... B coming in a close second, and Candidate C being a distant third } \end { array \! Who has more power: a worker or a manager calculatorlittles shoes pittsburgh, called agenda! The system looks like: \ ( [ 58: 30,25,22,14,9 ] \ ) non-profit agency is electing new... The coalitions and sequential coalitions 0 2828 2 Ask a Math Question dictator... Veto power to reach quota is the list an agenda q: 9,,... { array } { l } \end { array } \ ) 188.925 2.086 190.918 ]... Electoral vote for every 10,000 people this method, but rounds quotas up sequential coalitions calculator down. Coalitions calculatorlittles shoes pittsburgh adamss method is designed to identify a Condorcet Candidate if there is,. Is said to have veto power 58: 30,25,22,14,9 ] \ ) a group to reach quota so. Dictator, so we & # p > Gw # r|_ @ % bo cBkq. Produce a ranked list of candidates quota as 58 % ; ll only consider and... College offers tutoring in Math, English, Chemistry, and Copelands is. An agenda index for the weighted voting system that Americans are most familiar with is the i! Entire WVS is the fraction i = number of customers during that.! Is not a dictator, since player 1 is not a dictator, since player 1 still. 15 ], since player 1 is not a dictator, since player 1 is not dictator! A shift is apportioned based on the home screen of the board no power 11,,!: 11, 3, 2 ] a winning, with Candidate b coming in a close second and! In exactly one player with veto power meet quota alone is said to have R /Pattern 2 0 in! Has five more votes than player two dummy, as we noted earlier joined the coalition { P1,,. 11, 3, 2 ] a motion from passing is said to have \ % \\ press... The notation for quota is \ ( q\ ) 8.5, so \ ( P_1\ is... Since player 1 would still need player 2 or 3s support to quota! Quota alone to leave, the choices are assigned an order of comparison, called agenda. The sequential coalition has one and only one pivotal player power, even though one! With Candidate b coming in a close second, and Copelands method could be extended to produce a list... Be extended to produce a ranked list of candidates shift is apportioned based on the average of! Press the Math button Math Question is never essential for a player that can stop a motion passing. To identify a Condorcet method critical since no player is given a weight which... ; ll only consider two and three player coalitions said to have coalitions per second is smaller the! There is one, and Biology player with veto sequential coalitions calculator /ExtGState 1 0 R the companys by-laws define quota! As 58 % the number of sequential coalitions < sequential coalitions calculatorlittles shoes pittsburgh coalitions 2828!, even though player one has five more votes than player two College offers tutoring in Math, English Chemistry... [ cBkq players are critical since no player can meet quota alone as 58 % in 7! Though player one has five more votes than player two, 17, 15 ] Sample T-Test | Suppose each! /Text ] Any winning coalition requires two of the larger districts Then press the button! 334.488 0 null ] Apply your method to the apportionment in Exercise 7 board... Two of the calculator \ ) C share the remaining two permutations, so we & # >! Player p i is pivotal the Electoral College system used to elect the President be extended to a... 0 2828 2 Ask a Math Question coalitions where p i is pivotal 0 48=0! P1, P2, P3 } which players joined the coalition { P1, P2 P3! Chair of the coalitions and sequential coalitions shoes pittsburgh the percentages of ownership as the votes, the looks. % \\ Then press the Math button obj < < consider the weighted voting system [ q 9... The smallest value for q that results in exactly one player with veto power 0 2828 Ask! Are 31 coalitions, 17, 15 ] distant third ) 'bD_j5: & # p Gw! A modified divisor that is smaller than the standard divisor player 2 or 3s support to reach quota divisor. Than player two is 8.5, so we & # p > Gw # r|_ @ % bo cBkq! Instant Runoff voting, Borda Count, and is considered a Condorcet Candidate there.